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This paper examines a signaling explanation for environmental
subsidies: they attract attention to environmental friendly goods in a
credible way. When some households overestimate the level of envi-
ronmental damage, a perfectly informed government can use subsidies
to reveal that the environment is clean. Subsidies are the e¢ cient
means of signaling because the consequent consumption distortions
are most damaging in a dirty environment where, at the same time,
the consumption good generates polluting emissions and households
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1value it less than if it were environmental friendly. The more informed
households, the lower the level at which a subsidy is an e¢ cient signal.
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2Persuasive Subsidies in a Clean
Environment
1 Introduction
There is a widespread mistrust of subsidies among economists, which con-
tributes in particular to question their e¢ ciency in addressing environmental
problems. Although subsidies are, in this respect, the mirror image of taxes,
economists rely more on taxes to provide correct incentives for protecting or
enhancing environmental quality.
According to Baumol and Oates (1988), the e⁄ects of subsidies and taxes
on the reduction of the environmental damage are far to be equivalent. For
instance, subsidies, unlike taxes, may be suspected to induce excessive entry
of ￿rms with consequent resource misallocations (see chapter 14 of Bau-
mol and Oates (1988) for a comparison between the e⁄ects of subsidies and
taxes on the environment). More recently, Stavins (2000) observes that, ￿in
practice, many subsidies promote economically ine¢ cient and environmen-
tally unsound practices￿ . He quotes the US Forest Service￿ s ￿below-cost
timber sales￿as an example of market distortion. When Ja⁄e and Stavins
(1995) produce econometric evidence that energy-e¢ ciency technology adop-
tion subsidies may be more e⁄ective in some cases than energy taxes, they
present this ￿nding as ￿unanticipated￿and ￿at odds with economic think-
3ing￿ . Even when a subsidy is recognized the desirable role of correcting a
market imperfection such as the monopolist￿ s tendency to underproduce, it
seems weird in an environmental context to advise that pollution be subsi-
dized.
This paper examines a novel motive for environmental subsidies, based
on their wasteful nature. A subsidy may be a ￿money burning￿ message
intended to signal that the environment is clean when some uninformed
households overestimate the true environmental damage. A formal model
is developed to explain how environmental subsidies attract attention to en-
vironmental friendly goods in a credible way.
Subsidies will be thought of as tax cuts and credits that serve to encourage
the consumption of environmental friendly goods and services. These sub-
sidized goods can be exempli￿ed by ￿green electricity￿ , that is, electricity
generated with renewable sources of energy1.
The model investigates an economy characterized by households having
di⁄erential information about the state of the environment. This is consistent
with recent research by Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) who give some per-
1In the US Energy Policy Act of 1992, for instance, electricity produced from wind and
biomass fuels have received a credit, and solar and geothermal investments have received
up to a 10% tax credit. In many European countries like Britain, France, Germany
or Norway, governments also back the adoption of low-carbon-emitting alternatives with
generous subsidies. The French government o⁄ers various kinds of tax cuts to encourage
the residential use of renewable energies and help households pay back the cost of expensive
new equipment like solar cells. In Germany, consumers who sell renewable energy like solar
power to the central electricity grid, are o⁄ered highly attractive tari⁄s.
4suasive arguments in favor of the assumption that people are likely to form
various beliefs from the news delivered by media. As noticed by Schneider
and Volkert (1999), environmental problems are susceptible to substantial
information asymmetries kept up, on one hand, by the publications of in-
dustry and business associations, and on the other hand, by the spectacular
actions of environmental groups (for example, Greenpeace vs. Shell in Fall
1995). Di⁄erential information might indeed come from di¢ culties in com-
municating accurate information about pollution e⁄ects2 as well as about the
feasibility of alternative technologies, public disclosure of labeling programs,
the mass media3, or from the views of politicians, business associations or
environmental groups households trust. Boyer and La⁄ont (1999) argue that
the government generally has superior knowledge of the environmental dam-
age because she is endowed with superior data from con￿dential reports of
the public service bureaucracy. A second reason also mentioned by Boyer and
La⁄ont (1999) is that the government￿ s scienti￿c information on nonveri￿able
environmental variables may be costly to communicate.
In the present framework, some households ￿called ￿uninformed￿ ￿are
2As noted by Pearce (1991), scienti￿c opinion on this topic is changing rapidly as
new information comes to light. This author observes that ￿the scale of the threat from
chloro￿ uorocarbons has been revised upwards several times￿during the experience of the
Montreal Protocol.
3According to Lomborg (2001), the environmental message delivered on television and
in the newspapers is generally characterized by a tendency to overemphasize pessimistic
viewpoints and confronts the public with a lopsided version of reality giving the impression
that the global environment is in the worst shape.
5less informed than others ￿called ￿informed￿ ￿about the environmental
consequences of private consumption. The government is assumed to be
perfectly informed about the state of the environment. All households are
willing to pay more for environmental friendly goods. Since they have the
opportunity to observe the environmental action chosen by the government,
uninformed households can infer the true state of the environment. This im-
poses additional constraints in the standard welfare maximization program,
which give the government correct incentives to reveal information. The sub-
sidy emerges in equilibrium as the only ￿e¢ cient￿way of conveying all the
information in a clean environment where the environmental damage is over-
estimated by some uninformed households. This is all the more striking as
there would be no reason to subsidize the clean good under complete infor-
mation. The subsidy is e¢ cient in the sense that it minimizes the losses in
welfare which are accepted by the government to transmit information in a
credible way. In other words, the subsidy has the same ￿persuasive￿role as
that acknowledged for advertising in the industrial organization literature:
it raises the valuation of the subsidized good by changing households￿beliefs
(see Bagwell (2005)). Furthermore, with constant relative risk aversion util-
ity functions, it turns out that the subsidy is an e¢ cient device for signaling
the clean environment in a poorly informed economy, as long as the level
of environmental damage is not too high and households have a su¢ ciently
large willingness-to-pay for an environmental friendly product.
6When the environment is dirty, the Pigovian tax plays the same signaling
role as that played by the subsidy in a clean environment. However, it fully
reveals that environment is dirty with no distortion relative to what would
be optimal under complete information. Hence, it correctly internalizes the
environmental externalities while signaling the true damage.
The present analysis is somewhat related to two strands of the economics
literature. The ￿rst one deals with pollution control under imperfect com-
petition and the other one analyzes ￿scal action as a signaling device for the
government.
Barnett (1980) originates the ￿rst strand in providing theoretical foun-
dations for second-best Pigovian taxes in a monopoly context. Building on
his seminal work, Requate (1993) and Simpson (1995) have recently shown
that the government must subsidize the output of a monopoly or a symmetric
oligopoly in addition to the Pigovian tax so as to achieve a ￿rst-best outcome.
All these works abstract from informational considerations and emphasize the
essential role of subsidy in solving the ￿rms tendency to underproduce due
to their excessive market power.
The present analysis also links up with the literature on ￿scal actions
as signals in assuming that the government has an informational advantage
over economic agents. However, most of the works in this range of litera-
ture focus on taxes ￿environmental taxes when the issue at stake is market-
based instruments for environmental policy ￿and fail to provide direct insight
7into the informational role of subsidies. In Rogo⁄ (1990), citizens infer the
government￿ s administrative competence from tax and expenditure policies
distortions. This author argues that the political budget cycles may be a
socially e¢ cient mechanism for transmitting up-to-date information about
the government￿ s performance. Our approach di⁄ers not only in that it ab-
stracts from electoral pressures, but also we do not need to postulate that the
government in o¢ ce receives ego rents to explain signaling distortions. The
assumption that the politician￿ s interests may be entirely disjointed from
those of the citizens is also central in the analysis of Brett and Keen (2000).
They assume that incumbent policymakers have relevant private informa-
tion about the true environmental costs and bene￿ts of alternative policies.
They investigate the role of earmarking as a way of signaling both the type
of incumbent policymaker and the level of environmental damage. They
characterize equilibria for which earmarking is informative but the choice of
environmental tax is not. The analysis of Barigozzi and Villeneuve (2004)
is similar to ours in that the objective of a privately informed government
is to maximize welfare. In their model, households, unlike the government,
cannot ascertain the negative external e⁄ects of individual consumption. As
a result, the government must distort downward the Ramsey-Sandmo tax in
order to fully reveal information to households. The emergence of signaling
distortions crucially hinges on the fact that raising public funds is costly for
the government. In contrast, we deliberately leave aside such costs to start
8with the benchmark of an economy with no distortionary tax under sym-
metric information. Finally, all the papers that have previously explored the
strategic behavior of a privately informed government, like this one, draw
on the seminal articles in the literature of industrial organization by Mil-
grom and Roberts (1982 and 1986), in which a ￿rm uses prices, among other
variables, to signal its private information either on production costs or on
product quality.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives a reduced form signal-
ing framework from primitives on the economy, states some useful properties
and presents the benchmark case of complete information. Section 3 inves-
tigates the equilibria and testes their robustness to the intuitive criterion in
order to enlighten the informative role of subsidies and taxes. Section 4 o⁄ers
conclusions and proposes some extensions of the model.
2 The model
The economy is made up by N households who have identical preferences and
work to consume a good. This private consumption may have detrimental
e⁄ects on the environment. Households do not have the same information
about the state of the environment. Let "j be an index of the environmental
damage and assume, for simplicity, that the environment is either clean (j =
c) or dirty (j = d). The government and I households perfectly know the
9state of the environment, whereas N ￿ I households cannot ascertain it.
The latter will be called ￿uninformed￿ . Uninformed households hold prior
beliefs on the environmental damage represented as follows: they believe the
environment is clean with a commonly known probability ￿ 2 (0;1).
The household￿ s utility depends on one public good: environmental qual-
ity, and two private goods: consumption of the polluting good x and labor
l which is taken as the numeraire. Given a state "j of the environment,











where u(xi) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable, increasing and satis￿es
the usual strict concavity and Inada conditions. The last term in the right
hand side of (1) represents the environmental damage (or environmental ben-
e￿t from pollution reduction) which is directly related to the total consump-
tion of the polluting good. The per-unit damage "j is normalized to "c = 0
when the environment is clean, and so "d = " > 0 when the environment is
dirty. Households are assumed to be environmentally aware in the sense that
they are willing to pay more for a cleaner consumption good, hence we have
Q0 (") < 04. The assumption of the externality non-separability is consistent
4As usual, primes denote derivatives.
10with recent works in environmental economics that recognize the existence
of feedbacks between economic activity and environmental externalities (see,
for instance, Carbone and Smith (2007)).
Let b "(￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)" be the uninformed households￿perception of the
environmental damage. The uninformed household i￿ s utility depends on his
perception of environmental quality Q(b "(￿)) and is given by:
U(xi;li;b "(￿)) = Q(b "(￿))u(xi) ￿ li ￿b "(￿)￿
N
i=1xi: (2)
Note that the uninformed households￿willingness-to-pay for the product
is larger when the prior beliefs attach a higher probability to the environment
being clean: denoting b Q(￿) ￿ Q(b "(￿)), we have b Q0(￿) > 0.
We shall denote the price of the private good by p. The government
chooses a tax or a subsidy t (the value of t will be positive for a tax and
negative for a subsidy) on polluting consumption. Let T ￿ (￿p;+1) be the
set of possible taxes or subsidies. It will be assumed, as in Diamond (1973),
that any tax revenue is returned to the people via lump-sum transfers T which
will be negative in case of subsidies. The budget constraint for household i
amounts to (p + t)xi = li + T=N.
Uninformed households maximize the expected value of utility and, when
they decide on the consumption of polluting good, they neglect the ad-
verse e⁄ect of their personal polluting consumption on environmental quality.
11Household i chooses xi to maximize
b Q(￿)u(xi) ￿ (p + t)xi + T=N: (3)
The ￿rst-order condition for utility maximization is
b Q(￿)u
0(xi) = p + t: (4)
The equivalent equation is Q("j)u0(xi) = p + t when households are
informed and the the actual state of the environment is "j. By solving equa-
tion (4), we can write the demand for the polluting good by an uninformed
household as a function of the environmental tax and the beliefs about the
environment. Let X(t;￿) and X(t;"j) be the per capita demands of respec-
tively the uninformed and informed households.
Di⁄erentiating (4) yields the following partial derivatives for all t 2 T







where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Some instructive properties
emerge in our economy made of environmental friendly households. Clearly,
the uninformed households￿individual demand is both strictly decreasing
12with tax and strictly increasing with the probability that the environment is
clean. The latter property re￿ ects that ￿green￿households are less willing to
consume the polluting good when the environment is perceived to be dirty.
Similar calculations for the informed households yield Xt(t;"j) = 1
Q("j)u00 < 0
and X"(t;") = ￿
Q0u0
Q("j)u00 < 0, hence informed households consume more when
the environmental tax is lower (the subsidy is higher) and/or the environment
is cleaner.
Market equilibrium for the polluting good is such that total output must
equal the sum of individual consumptions. Treating all individuals identi-
cally, we omit subscript i and denote by L(￿) (resp. L("j)) the labor force
of an uninformed (resp. informed) household. Market equilibrium for each
state of the environment can be written as:
IL("
j) + (N ￿ I)L(￿) = IpX(t;"
j) + (N ￿ I)pX(t;￿);j = c;d: (6)
Let us consider the ￿rst best outcome when the state of the environment
is "j. Then, the government aims to maximize welfare subject to the decen-
tralized optimizing behavior of households. Following Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1980, chap 16, p. 493), the government￿ s budget constraint can be obtained
by summing the individual budget constraints and subtracting the market
13clearing condition (6):
tIX(t;"
j) + t(N ￿ I)X(t;￿)) = T: (7)
It follows that the social welfare when the environmental state is "j and is
perceived by the uninformed households to be clean with probability ￿ upon
seeing t, can be written in the following reduced form function W(t;"j;￿) :
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j) + (N ￿ I)X(t;￿)
￿
The expression given in (8) shows that social welfare has three compo-
nents: ￿rst, private welfare of informed households which depends on the
true state of the environment, second, private welfare of the uninformed
households which depends on their perception of the environmental state,
and third, environmental welfare which depends on both the true "j and the
uninformed households￿beliefs. By underestimating the environmental dam-
age, an uninformed household consumes more than an informed household,
and so raises the social cost of pollution in a dirty environment. The wrong
perception of the dirty environment strengthens the negative external e⁄ect
of the uninformed households￿consumption on the environment. This is no
14longer true when the environment is clean. Then, an uninformed house-
hold consumes less than an informed household because he attaches some
probability to the environment being dirty. However, this has no external
e⁄ect on the environment. In some sense, when the environment is dirty, the
government has to address the problem of the informational externality ex-
erted by uninformed households, in addition to the environmental externality
problem.
Benchmark case of complete information.
Let us now de￿ne tj(￿) as the maximizer of W(t;"j;￿) with respect to t,
for j = c;d. It can be found in Appendix 1 that tj(￿) = N"j, hence it does
not depend on the uninformed households￿perception of the environment.
Consider the benchmark cases where all households are informed. Then, the
optimal discretionary tax is simply the Pigovian level N"j that fully inter-
nalizes the marginal environmental damage. Under complete information,
the government has no reason to tax or subsidize the good when the environ-
mental damage is nil. When the environment is dirty, the government must
levy the Pigovian tax N". Hence, there is no rationale for subsidies here,
under complete information.
The model has two essential properties which will prove useful to inves-
tigate the reduced form signaling model in the subsequent analysis.
Single-crossing property
The model is strongly structured by a single-crossing property which takes
15the following form:
Wt"j(t;"
j;￿) > 0: (9)
In the present context, the single-crossing property (9) is quite intuitive.
It means that the government is more inclined to give subsidies when the
environment is clean than when it is dirty. The main reason is that, by
boosting consumption, subsidies increase the environmental damage when-
ever it exists, that is, in the dirty environment and not in the clean one.
Moreover, it turns out that the e⁄ects of subsidies on welfare in a clean en-
vironment are less detrimental either when households are more willing to
pay for environmental friendly goods or when households are more informed
about the true environmental damage (see equation (20) in Appendix 1). It
can be shown that the single-crossing property always holds for subsidies.
To ensure that condition (9) is also met for high levels of taxes, it su¢ ces
to consider that the households￿valuation of the consumption good does not
change too much from one state of the environment to the other, i. e., jQ0j
is su¢ ciently small in the sense de￿ned in Appendix 1.
Stochastic dominance property
It is shown in Appendix 2 that the following property of stochastic dom-
inance is satis￿ed.
For all "j 2 f"d;"cg;￿ 2 [0;1], and t 2 T , W￿(t;"j;￿) > 0.
This property states that, for a wide range of taxes and subsidies, social
16welfare is higher when the uninformed households attach a higher probability
to the environment being clean. Hence, ￿ = 0 is the least favorable belief
for the government, whatever the state of the environment. The stochastic
dominance is an essential property of standard signaling games5. Figure 1
depicts possible shapes for the social welfare functions W(t;"j;￿); for j = c;d
and ￿ = 0;1.
An increase in ￿ makes the consumption good more attractive because
environmental friendliness as perceived by households is considered as a ver-
tical attribute of the good. This raises the uninformed demand for the good,
thereby lifting up their private component of social welfare (see (8)). Con-
sequently, the government prefers uninformed households to think that the
environment is clean regardless of the true state of the environment. When
the environment is clean, the stochastic dominance property provides the
government with an incentive to convey information on the true state of the
environment. Nevertheless, when the environment is dirty, the government
may be reluctant to modify the uninformed households￿perception of the
environmental damage. Instead of transmitting all the information through
her choice of tax, the government can also mimic the environmental policy
she would choose were the environment clean, thereby providing no informa-
tion to the uninformed. Without any further information on the state of the
5This property is implied by assumptions A1￿ , A2 and A3 taken together page 392
in Cho and Sobel (1990) or directly assumed page 255 in Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and
Postlewaite (1993.)
17environment, the uninformed households consume more than if they were
fully informed and attain a high level of private well-being which is likely to
compensate the corresponding degradation of environmental quality.
3 The Signaling Role of the Government￿ s
Behavior
3.1 The Game and the De￿nition of Equilibrium
The government￿ s choice of environmental policy can be observed by un-
informed households before they make their consumption decision. From
the level of tax or subsidy, uninformed consumers may be able to infer the
true state of the environment. This gives the model a structure of signaling
game, for which strategies must form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. As sug-
gested by Harsanyi (1967-8), such a game of incomplete information can be
replaced by a game of complete but imperfect information which unfolds in
three stages. First, ￿Nature￿draws a state "j of the environment from the set
f"c;"dg according to the probability distribution ￿0. Second, the government
learns the state of the environment and chooses a tax or a subsidy on the
consumption good. After observing this choice, households in the third stage
rely on their inferences upon the true value of "j to make their consumption
decision. Let ￿(t) : (0;1)￿T ! [0;1] denote the uninformed households￿pos-
18terior belief that the state of the environment is "c, which updates the prior
￿0 when the tax (eventually negative) is t. The government, in turn, must
take into account how her choice of t in￿ uences the uninformed households￿
inferences. Restricting attention to pure strategies, a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium of this game is a set of strategies f(tj)j=c;d;(X￿
i (t;b "(￿￿ (t))))i=1;2:::;Ng
and a probability distribution ￿￿ (t) such that, at any stage of the game,
strategies must be optimal given beliefs:
Condition 1: optimality condition for the government.













￿ (t))u(xi) ￿ (p + t)xi + T=N
o
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for the informed households.















19Condition 1 demands that the government￿ s choice maximizes social wel-
fare given that households respond optimally. Condition 2 states that house-
holds￿consumption of the good should maximize their utility given, in the
case of uniformed households, their beliefs induced by the government￿ s be-
havior. Finally, condition 3 requires the uniformed households￿posterior
beliefs about "j to be formed from their prior beliefs by using Bayes￿rule
for the governments￿equilibrium strategies. As usual, the equilibrium con-
cept places no restriction on beliefs o⁄ the equilibrium path. To tackle the
problem of equilibria multiplicity, we will impose the additional restrictions
on o⁄-the-equilibrium-path beliefs required by the ￿intuitive criterion￿(see
Cho and Kreps (1987)). Formally, consider an equilibrium in which the level
of social welfare is W j when the state of the environment is "j. Then the









3.2 The Analysis of Equilibrium
Our interest now is not really a characterization of all perfect Bayesian equi-
libria in the model but rather a characterization of the set of perfect Bayesian
equilibrium taxes and subsidies. We can without loss of generality let the




from the property of stochastic dominance that such out-of-equilibrium be-
liefs are always the least favorable for the government. Such beliefs are the
strongest too in that, if a government does not have an incentive to set t
when ￿(t) 6= 0; then she will not have an incentive when ￿(t) = 0, since
social welfare is lower, whatever the state of the environment. Therefore
setting ￿(t) = 0 will generate all of the possible perfect Bayesian equilibrium
paths.
Let tc and td denote the separating equilibrium levels of tax or subsidy
when, respectively, the environment is clean and dirty. The next lemma
states that the best choice for the government is to set td equal to the Pigov-
ian level when the environment is dirty. In this case, the Pigovian tax is
serving two functions at the same time: it conveys all the information from
the government to uninformed households, while internalizing the pollution
externalities in a conventional way.
Lemma 2: If ￿(t) = 0 for all t = 2
￿
td;tc￿
, then in any separating
equilibrium td = N".
Proof : (see Appendix 3)
Consider now situations where the uninformed households believe they
know the true state of the environment. If the uninformed households assign
probability 1 to the clean environment while the environment is in fact dirty,
21uninformed demand for the polluting good after observing some tax t is
X(t;1) and social welfare is given by W(t;"d;1). On the other hand, if
the uninformed households are wrongly convinced that the environment is
dirty, demand and social welfare are respectively IX(t;"c)+(N ￿ I)X(t;0)
and W(t;"c;0). Setting a zero tax in such a context would yield a welfare
of W(0;"c;0), which is the lowest level that can be attained with no tax
in the presence of uninformed households. The welfare W(0;"c;0) can be
interpreted as the opportunity cost for the government to fully transmit
information on the clean environment.
To achieve separation when the environment is clean, the government











Condition (12) ensures that uninformed households would not mistake
the dirty state of the environment for the clean state if they were observing
tc in a dirty environment. We have previously seen that the government could
conceal information when the environment is dirty in an attempt to enhance
the uninformed households￿willingness-to-pay for the polluting good and lift
22up their private welfare. Condition (12) rules out such a pooling strategy.
The government must choose the complete information Pigovian tax and fully
transmit information on the true state of the environment rather than trick
uninformed households into believing that the environment is clean by setting
tc. As can be seen in Figure 1, constraint (12) de￿nes a set Td of possible
taxes or subsidies tc that satisfy (12). The equality version of (12) admits an
upper and lower root which will be denoted by td and td respectively.
Condition (13) provides the government with an incentive for reveal-
ing information when the environment is clean. From (13), the government
would rather choose tc and transmit all information than let the uniformed
households wrongly perceive the environment as dirty and optimize accord-
ingly. Let Tb denote the interval of taxes or subsidies for which condition
(13) is met (see Figure 1) and de￿ne tc and tc as, respectively, the upper and
lower root of equation W(t;"c;1) = W(0;"c;0).
In order to fully reveal that the environment is clean, the government
must choose tc in the interval Td\Tc provided that the latter is non empty.
This interval is depicted in Figure 1. Proposition 1 establishes necessary
conditions for the existence of separating equilibria in which manifold taxes
or subsidies may signal the clean environment.
Proposition 1: If ￿(t) = 0 for all t = 2
￿
td;tc￿




T ￿ T such that td = N" and tc 2 [tc;td] is part of a separating equilibrium.
23Proof : (see Appendix 4)
One surprising insight is the emergence of a tax or a subsidy when the
environmental damage is nil. Indeed, the analysis in Appendix 4 identi￿es
two possible cases for tc depending on whether td is lower or higher than 0 (or,
equivalently, W(0;"d;1) is higher or lower than W(td;"d;0)). First, if td < 0,
then separation is achieved with a subsidy tc < 0 when the environment is
clean. Second, if td > 0, then the separating equilibrium involves a tax tc > 0.
Hence, signaling a clean environment can take the the form of a subsidy as
well as a tax. What really matters here is that either instrument generates
a social cost which would be unbearable were the environment dirty.
By examining an usual motive for taxes, the model emphasizes a novel
rationale for subsidies. Not only are taxes being used here to internalize
the pollution externalities when the environment is dirty, but they convey
information in either state of the environment. A subsidy can only play
the signaling role. Subsidizing the good is socially costly in both states of
the environment because it distorts the households￿consumption from the
￿rst-best level. Nevertheless, it is relatively less costly for the government to
subsidize the consumption of an environmental friendly good which causes
no environmental damage. Consequently, there may exist a subsidy inside
Td\Tc when the environment is clean, too high to be duplicated when the
environment is dirty, at which all information is conveyed from the govern-
ment to uninformed households. Equilibrium taxes and subsidies have the
24common feature in the clean environment that they entail signaling costs
that must be paid to achieve separation.
Note that if we were to consider the case in which the per-unit damage "
is a random variable described by a cumulative distribution function and a
density with continuum support
￿
"c;"d￿
, the reduced form signaling frame-
work derived from primitives on the economy satis￿es the conditions stated
by Mailath (1987) which guarantee the existence of separating equilibria.
The potential existence of separating equilibria does not dismiss pooling
equilibria. Let t￿ denote the uninformative tax or subsidy that gives a pooling
equilibrium. As the government provides no information at equilibrium, the
uninformed households￿beliefs remain unchanged after observing t￿. To be










The right-hand side of the inequalities above re￿ ects, in each state of the
environment, the welfare levels that can be attained at best when uninformed
households hold the least favorable beliefs. Given the prior beliefs about the
true state of the environment, the government should at least reach these
levels to successfully conceal information in equilibrium with t￿.
Consider the equality version of (14) and de￿ne td (￿0) and td (￿0) as,
25respectively, the upper and lower root of this equation in t. De￿ne tc (￿0)
and tc (￿0) in the same way with W(t;"c;￿0) = W(0;"c;0). An argument
similar to that given in Appendix 4 yields that td (￿0) < tc (￿0). The set
of pooling equilibrium taxes and subsidies is characterized in the following
lemma..




can be supported as a pooling
equilibrium by beliefs ￿￿(t) = 0 for all t 6= t￿.
Any deviation t from the pooling tax t￿ is such that W(t;"d;0) ￿ W(td;"d;0) ￿
W(t￿;"d;￿0) and W(t;"c;0) ￿ W(0;"c;0) ￿ W(t￿;"c;￿0). Therefore, out-of-
equilibrium beliefs involving ￿￿(t) = 0 are likely to support t￿ as a pooling
equilibrium.
The next proposition establishes that restrictions on o⁄-the-equilibrium
path beliefs required by (10) and (11) eliminate all the pooling equilibria and
single out the so-called ￿least-cost separating equilibrium￿which has received
much emphasis in the work of Spence (1974), Riley (1979) and Cho-Kreps
(1987), among others.
The two cases mentioned in the analysis of separating equilibria yield
two di⁄erent ￿intuitive￿equilibrium outcomes. Their emergence depends on
the value of the di⁄erential " = "d ￿ "c. For small values of ", we have
W(0;"d;1) > W(td;"d;0). This may also be the case if, for a given ", the
economy is poorly informed about the environment, i. e., I is close to zero.
26Then, the government faced with a dirty environment can be said to ￿envy￿
the clean environment policy that achieves the high level of consumption
X(0;1) = X(0;"c) with zero tax. In the opposite case, such an envy vanishes
since it is socially too costly for the government faced with a dirty environ-
ment to deviate from the Pigovian tax and set zero tax, even if doing so
would convince uninformed households that the environment is clean and
so boost their consumption. The latter case arises only if the two possible
values "d and "c are su¢ ciently di⁄erent. Note that such a case could not be
captured by considering that "j is continuous.
Proposition 2: The unique equilibrium robust to the intuitive criterion
is the least-costly separating one characterized by:
￿ the Pigovian tax td = N" when the environment is dirty, and the
subsidy tc = td < 0 when the environment is clean, if W(0;"d;1) ￿
W(td;"d;0);
￿ the Pigovian tax td = N" when the environment is dirty, and tc = 0
when the environment is clean, if W(0;"d;1) < W(td;"d;0).
Proof : (see Appendix 5)
When the government faced with a dirty environment is envious of the
clean environment policy, i. e., W(0;"d;1) ￿ W(td;"d;0), the subsidy td is
the e¢ cient means to reveal to uninformed households that the environment
27is clean. This is the only case where signaling entails a welfare sacri￿ce since
the subsidy raises households￿consumption above the ￿rst-best level. The
subsidy can work as a signal because the government has less to lose from
getting households to consume more when the environment is clean than
when it is dirty. In fact, consumption distortions have negative polluting
e⁄ects in a dirty environment, not in a clean one. Furthermore, any pooling
equilibrium is removed by attractive deviations in a range of subsidies sus-
ceptible to convince uninformed consumers that the environment is clean. It
is important to stress that, in this case, no information could be revealed in
the absence of subsidies. Suppose that the government has neither the au-
thority not the inclination to subsidize the environmental friendly good, then
only pooling equilibrium taxes can emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, such
taxes would be robust to the intuitive criterion since it would be forbidden
to o⁄er subsidies in the range mentioned in the Appendix, where deviations
might be attractive. Relative to the least-costly separating equilibrium with
subsidy, households may or may not be better o⁄ in a pooling equilibrium,
depending on the costs of the lost information versus the saving in signaling.
When the clean environment policy is no longer a temptation for the
government faced with a dirty environment, i. e., W(0;"d;1) < W(td;"d;0),
the equilibrium selection yields that the government should adopt the same
policy as that under complete information. The Pigovian tax turns to be
an e¢ cient instrument for signaling the true state of the environment, that
28is, zero tax when the environment is clean. Although, by Proposition 1,
a positive tax may signal the clean environment in equilibrium, it is not
robust to the intuitive criterion. Indeed, with zero tax, the government can
also convince uninformed households that the environment is clean, and at a
lower social cost. Intuitively, the government will choose the least-costly way
of fully revealing information. Unlike subsidies in the previous case, taxes in
this case entail no social cost and households become informed for free.
As the role of subsidies is purely informative in the clean environment, one
expects subsidies to decline as more households become informed about the
state of the environment. This has already been suggested while examining
the single-crossing property: a larger number of informed households was
shown to mitigate the detrimental e⁄ects of subsidies on welfare in a clean
environment. Intuitively, the burden of the signaling cost should be reduced
in a more informed economy, thereby decreasing the level of consumption
distortion necessary to fully convey information. The result in the next
corollary formally captures this intuition.
Corollary 1: The least-costly separating equilibrium subsidy decreases
with I : limI!0
dtd
dI > 0.
Proof : (see Appendix 6)
Clearly from this result, the informed households generate a positive ex-
ternality favorable to the uninformed households. Let us now state the nec-
29essary and su¢ cient condition for a separating equilibrium subsidy to exist
when the government faced with a dirty environment is envious of the clean
environment policy and no household is informed.
Corollary 2: The least-costly separating equilibrium subsidy exists when
I = 0 if and only if
Q(0)u(X(0;"c)) ￿ Q(")u(X(td;"d))
X(0;"c) ￿ X(td;"d)
> p + "N: (16)
Proof : (see Appendix 7)
Whether condition (16) is met depends on a number of factor. To get
more intuition, it is useful to examine this for a particular case. Consider for
instance the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions u(x) =
x1￿￿
1￿￿ , where 0 < ￿ ￿ 1, so that u(x) = lnx as ￿ ! 1. Moreover, normalize
as follows: N = 1;Q(") = 1, and denote Q(0) ￿ q. For this case, the






and X(t;"d) = (p + t)
￿ 1
￿, which
can be substituted into (16) to yield
q
1





It turns out that the least-costly separating equilibrium exists when I = 0
unless ￿p + "(￿ ￿ 1) < 0. As the single-crossing condition always holds
30when t is a subsidy (see Appendix 1), the separating equilibrium subsidy td
will actually exist when I = 0 if " is su¢ ciently small and q is su¢ ciently
large. In other words, the subsidy is an e¢ cient device for signaling the
clean environment in a poorly informed economy, as long as the level of
environmental damage is not too high and the incremental willingness-to-
pay for an environmental friendly product is su¢ ciently large.
4 Conclusion
This paper develops a signaling rationale for subsidies in an economy where
the government has better information about the environmental damage than
some households do. When these uninformed households overestimate the
level of environmental damage, the government can use subsidies to fully
reveal information. Like money burning expenditures for advertising, subsi-
dies are persuasive rather than directly informative in that they lift up the
uninformed households￿willingness-to-pay for a clean good.
Subsidies entail losses in welfare that the government must accept to
convey her superior information in a credible manner. Subsidies turn out to
be optimal means for signaling the clean environment because the government
has less to lose from getting households to consume more a good that protects
the environment than a good that deteriorates it. Furthermore, compared to
a clean environment, the government faced with a dirty environment increases
31less private welfare with subsidies since informed households are less eager
to consume the private good. Understanding that the society in a dirty
environment will su⁄er from further degradation of environmental quality,
whereas it will not in a clean environment, uninformed households rationally
expect subsidies to mean clean environment.
As a result, the intuitive criterion singles out the equilibrium in which
the subsidy is the minimum waste necessary to signal the clean environment.
This is shown to arise only when the government faced with a dirty environ-
ment is envious of the clean environment policy. In this case, it would be
socially detrimental to forbid subsidies. Taxes, either positive or null, would
then emerge as the only existing pooling equilibria. However, the cost of con-
cealing information, even with zero tax, may be greater than the signaling
cost of subsidies when the environment is clean, depending on the level of
prior beliefs.
Two further observations are in order. First, the government can e¢ -
ciently signal the clean environment with a lower subsidy as more households
are informed about the true environmental damage. Second, two factors
make separating equilibrium subsidies more likely to appear in a poorly in-
formed economy: a low level of environmental damage in a dirty environment
and a high incremental willingness-to-pay for a clean good.
It would be worthwhile to examine how robust the conclusions of the
paper would be in a dynamic setting. In this line of research, one possible
32extension borrowed from Bagwell and Riordan (1991) would be to consider
that the number of informed households grows as time passes. Since it would
become easier for the government to signal the clean environment, subsidies
might decline over time. Another line of research is to seek empirical support
for the theoretical ￿nding that subsidies are correlated with higher environ-
mental quality and to test whether this relationship depends on the amount
of households￿information.
335 Appendix
5.1 Appendix 1: Complete information and single-crossing
property























j) + (N ￿ I)Xt(t;￿)
￿
:
Using the ￿rst-order conditions for utility maximization, that is, Q("j)u0(xi) =
p + t for informed households and (4) for uninformed households, we get
Wt(t;"




j) + (N ￿ I)Xt(t;￿)
￿
: (19)
Thus, for all ￿ 2 [0;1], tj(￿) = N"j. The Inada conditions u0(0) = +1
and u0 (+1) = 0 ensure that the maximum is interior. The second-order
condition for welfare maximization when evaluated at the optimum yields
Wtt(t;"j;￿) = IXt(t;"j)+(N ￿ I)Xt(t;￿) which is negative due to the strict
concavity of u(x).















From the equation above, when I is close to 0, Wt"j(t;"j;￿) tends to
￿N2Xt(t;￿) > 0. Thus, there exists some e I > 0 such that, for all t 2 T ,
I < e I and ￿ 2 [0;1], we have Wt"j(t;"j;￿) > 0.
As Xt(t;"j) = 1
Q("j)u00, we have Xt"j(t;"j) = ￿
Q0
Q2u00 < 0: Note that, for
all t ￿ N"j, the condition Wt"j(t;"j;￿) > 0 is met. In particular, the single-
crossing condition always holds when t is a subsidy. In such a case, the ￿rst
term in the right-hand side of (20) increases with I and jQ0j. Hence, the
single-crossing property is more likely to hold either when households are
more willing to pay for environmental friendly goods or when households are
more informed about the true environmental damage.
When t > N"j, the ￿rst term in the right hand side of (20) is negative,
hence the single-crossing property may be reversed for su¢ ciently high values

















Note ￿rst that the lower is jQ0j, the higher is b t("j;￿). As for all ￿ 2 [0;1],
35b t("j;1) < b t("j;￿), we have that, for all t < b t("j;1), condition Wt"j(t;"j;￿) > 0
is met whatever ￿. For expositional convenience, we will assume henceforth





j;0);j = c;d: (22)
This will ensure that the single-crossing holds for every tax lower than
b t("j;1).
5.2 Appendix 2: Stochastic dominance property
From the expression given in (8), di⁄erentiating W(t;"j;￿) with respect to
￿ yields:
W￿(t;"













Using (4), (23) can be rewritten
W￿(t;"










For all t ￿ N"j, W￿(t;"j;￿) > 0, and so the latter inequality is met
for taxes higher than the Pigovian level. If now t < N"j, consider ￿rst
that t = ￿p. Recall from (5) that X￿(t;￿) = ￿
b Q0(￿)u0
b Q(￿)u00. Substituting this
36expression into (24) yields for t = ￿p:
W￿(￿p;"











where u0(X(￿p;￿)) = 0. Thus, we have W￿(￿p;"j;￿) > 0. Further-
more, by (19), W￿t(t;"j;￿) = (t￿"jN)(N ￿ I)X￿t(t;￿) where X￿t(t;￿) > 0.
Hence, W￿(t;"j;￿) is strictly monotonic for t < N"j. It follows that inequal-
ity W￿(t;"j;￿) > 0 holds for all t 2 T .
5.3 Appendix 3: Proof of lemma 2
Suppose for a contradiction that there exists a separating equilibrium in
which td 6= N". As the uninformed households￿expectations are correct
at equilibrium, the resulting social welfare is W(t;"d;0) which is strictly
lower than W(N";"d;0). Then, the government would have an incentive to
deviate to t = N" whatever the households￿inference ￿ from observing this








From the stochastic dominance property, W￿(N";"d;￿) > 0, thus,
R 0
￿ W￿(N";"d;￿)d￿ <
0 and W(N";"d;0) < W(N";"d;￿). If td 6= N", then W(td;"d;0) < W(N";"d;0)
37and so W(td;"d;0) < W(N";"d;￿). Moreover, td = N" can be supported as
the only separating equilibrium tax when the environment is dirty, given the
assumption ￿(t) = b ￿ for all t 6= td since W(t;"d;0) < W(N";"d;0).
5.4 Appendix 4: Proof of proposition 1



















The single-crossing property (9) guarantees that, for all ￿ 2 [0;1] and all





Wt"(t;";1)d"dt > 0; (29)
and so
tc < td: (30)
38With a similar argument, it is straightforward to state that tc < td .
For this, jQ0j must be su¢ ciently small to ful￿ll (22), which guarantees that
td < b t("d;1) (see Appendix 1) and so allows to use the single-crossing prop-
erty. Thus, Tc\Td = [tc;td] 6= 0 if td < tc, and Tc\Td = Tc otherwise. For
expositional convenience, we will restrict attention to the case td < tc so that
Tc\Td = [tc;td].
This leaves the possibility for two di⁄erent cases depending on whether
td is lower or higher than 0 (or, equivalently, W(0;"d;1) is higher or lower
than W(td;"d;0)). If td < 0, then separation is achieved with a subsidy
tc < 0 when the environment is clean. If td > 0, then the separating





as a separating equilibrium in a clean environment by out-of-equilibrium
beliefs such that ￿￿(t) = 0 for all t 6= tc. Such beliefs make a devia-
tion t from equilibrium unattractive when the environment is clean since
W(t;"c;0) ￿ W(0;"c;0) = W(tc;"c;1) ￿ W(tc;"c;1), and also when the
environment is dirty since W(t;"d;0) ￿ W(td;"d;0).
5.5 Appendix 5: Proof of proposition 2
Consider the case W(0;"d;1) ￿ W(td;"d;0). Then, td ￿ 0 since td is the
lower root in t of equation W(t;"d;1) = W(td;"d;0).
Suppose now that separation is achieved in equilibrium at tc < td. Then,
for all ￿ > 0 such that tc + ￿ < td, we have W(tc + ￿;"c;1) < W(td;"c;1)
39because W(t;"c;1) is increasing in t < 0. Moreover, W(tc + ￿;"d;1) <
W(td;"c;1) = W(td;"d;0). Hence, tc + ￿ is a deviation that ful￿lls both
(10)and (11). Thus, any separating equilibrium in which tc < td fails to
survive the intuitive criterion.
Consider now a pooling equilibrium tax t￿. There exist two values t0 and
t00 to the left of t such that, respectively, W(t0;"c;1) = W(t￿;"c;￿0) and
W(t00;"d;1) = W(t￿;"d;￿0). Using the same technique as that in Appendix
4, one can easily show that t0 < t00. It follows that any deviation t inside
(t0;t00) ful￿lls the two conditions W(t￿;"c;￿0) < W(t;"c;1) and W(t;"d;1) <
W(t￿;"d;￿0), which causes elimination of the pooling equilibrium by the
intuitive criterion:
Consider now the case W(0;"d;1) < W(td;"d;0). Then, td > 0 and
separation is achieved with a tax tc 2 [tc;td]. However, a deviation at t = 0
is potentially attractive for the government faced with the clean environment
when this deviation induces the belief that the environment is clean for sure.
The intuitive criterion precisely imposes to restrict beliefs in this sense, for
t = 0. As W(tc;"c;1) < W(0;"c;1) and W(0;"d;1) < W(td;"d;0), any
separating equilibrium with a positive tax inside [tc;td] fails to survive the
intuitive criterion. Furthermore, the argument to eliminate all the pooling
equilibria in this case is similar to that used in the previous case.
405.6 Appendix 6: Proof of corollary 1
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Furthermore, the welfare di⁄erential in the right-hand side of this equation








which is positive by the stochastic dominance property. As td < td, we










5.7 Appendix 7: Proof of corollary 1



































































Condition W(0;"d;1) > W(td;"d;0) then amounts to (16).
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Welfare functions and separating equilibrium subsidies 